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ABSTRACT
Previous research about sensor based attacks on Android platform
focused mainly on accessing or controlling over sensitive device
components, such as camera, microphone and GPS. These ap-
proaches get data from sensors directly and need corresponding
sensor invoking permissions.
This paper presents a novel approach (GVS-Attack) to launch
permission bypassing attacks from a zero permission Android
application (VoicEmployer) through the speaker. The idea of GVS-
Attack utilizes an Android system built-in voice assistant module
– Google Voice Search. Through Android Intent mechanism,
VoicEmployer triggers Google Voice Search to the foreground, and
then plays prepared audio files (like “call number 1234 5678”) in
the background. Google Voice Search can recognize this voice
command and execute corresponding operations. With ingenious
designs, our GVS-Attack can forge SMS/Email, access privacy
information, transmit sensitive data and achieve remote control
without any permission.
Also we found a vulnerability of status checking in Google
Search app, which can be utilized by GVS-Attack to dial arbitrary
numbers even when the phone is securely locked with password. A
prototype of VoicEmployer has been implemented to demonstrate
the feasibility of GVS-Attack in real world. In theory, nearly all
Android devices equipped with Google Services Framework can
be affected by GVS-Attack. This study may inspire application
developers and researchers rethink that zero permission doesn’t
mean safety and the speaker can be treated as a new attack surface.
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, smartphones are becoming more and more popu-
lar, among which Android OS pushed past 80% market share [31].
One attraction of smartphones is that users can install applications
(apps for short) by themselves conveniently. But this convenience
∗Responsible disclosure: We have reported the vulnerability of
Google Search app and corresponding attack schemes to Google
security team on May 16th 2014.
†Demo video can be found on the following website: https://
sites.google.com/site/demogvs/
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also brings serious malicious application problems which have
been noticed by both academic and industry areas. According to
Kaspersky’s annual security report [33], Android platform attracted
a whopping 98.05% of known malware in 2013.
Current Android phones are equipped with several kinds of
sensors, such as light sensor, accelerometer, microphone, GPS,
etc. They enhance the user experience and can be used to develop
creative apps. However, these sensors also could be utilized as
powerful weapons for mobile malwares to steal user privacy. Tak-
ing microphone as an example, a malicious app can record phone
conversations which may contain sensitive business information
directly. With some special designs, even credit card and PIN
number can be extracted from recorded voice [44].
Nearly all previous sensor based attacks [44, 39, 12, 9, 45, 47,
29] only considered invoking input type of device components
to achieve malicious targets, such as accelerometer for device
posture analysis and microphone for audio recording. These
attacks are based on accessing or controlling over sensitive sen-
sors directly, which means specific permissions are needed, such
as CAMERA for camera, RECORD_AUDIO for microphone, and
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION for GPS. Actually output type of
permission-free device components (e.g. speaker) also can be
utilized to launch attacks, namely an indirect approach.
Consider the following question:
Q: To a zero permission Android app which only invokes
permission-free sensors, what malicious targets it can achieve?
In general, zero permission means harmlessness and extremely
limited functions. However, our research results show:
A: Through invoking the speaker, this zero permission app can
make phone calls, forge SMS/Email, steal personal schedules,
get the user location, transmit data remotely, etc.
This paper presents a novel attack scheme based on the speaker
and an Android built-in voice assistant module – Google Voice
Search (so we call it GVS-Attack). GVS-Attack can be launched
through a totally zero permission Android malware (called VoicEm-
ployer correspondingly). This attack can achieve varied malicious
targets based on sensitive permissions bypassing.
GVS-Attack utilizes system build-in voice assistant functions.
Voice assistant apps are handy little apps which can accept voice
commands from the user and execute corresponding operations.
In general, typical voice commands include dialing (like “call
Jack”), querying (like “what’s weather tomorrow”) and so on.
Benefited from the development of speech recognition and other
natural language processing techniques [15], voice assistant apps
facilitate users’ daily operations and become an important selling
point of smartphones. Every mainstream smartphone platform
has its own built-in voice assistant app, such as Siri [7] for iOS
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and Cortana [35] for Windows Phone. On Android platform, this
function is implemented by Google Voice Search1 (see Figure 1)
which has been merged to Google Search app as a module from
Android 4.1. Users can start Google Voice Search through touching
the microphone icon of Google Search app widget, the shortcut
named Voice Search, etc. Like other voice assistant apps, Google
Voice Search can execute several kinds of operations without user
touching the screen.
(a) Voice Dialer Mode (b) Velvet Mode
Figure 1: Google Voice Search on Android
The basic idea behind GVS-Attack is to exploit the capabilities
of Google Voice Search. Through Android Intent mechanism,
VoicEmployer triggers Google Voice Search to the foreground,
and then plays an audio file in the background. The audio file is
special designed and the content is a voice command, such as “call
number 1234 5678”. This command can be recognized by Google
Voice Search and the corresponding operation would be executed.
Through utilizing a vulnerability of status checking in Google
Search app, zero permission based VoicEmployer can dial arbitrary
malicious numbers even when the phone is securely locked. With
ingenious designs, GVS-Attack can forge SMS/Email, access
privacy information, transmit sensitive data and achieve remote
control without any permission. Also context-aware information
collection and analysis can assist GVS-Attack, which makes this
attack more practical.
It is difficult to identify the malicious behaviors of VoicEmployer
through current mainstream Android malware analysis techniques.
From the aspect of permission checking [8, 21], VoicEmployer
doesn’t need any permission. From the aspect of app dynamic
behavior analysis [20, 52], VoicEmployer doesn’t execute ma-
licious actions directly. The actual executor is Google Voice
Search, a "trust" system built-in app module. In addition, played
voice commands are outputted by the speaker and captured by
the microphone as input. This inter-application communication
channel and transmission media are beyond the control of Android
OS. We tested several famous anti-virus apps (AVG, McAfee, etc.)
to monitor the process of GVS-Attack. None of them can detect
GVS-Attack and report VoicEmployer as a malware.
1Some people confuse Google Now with Google Voice Search,
even the corresponding entries on Wikipedia. Actually Google
Voice Search module can be invoked independently with disabling
Google Now. See http://www.google.com/landing/now/
Contributions. We summarize this paper’s contributions here:
• New Attack Method and Surface. To the best of our knowl-
edge, GVS-Attack is the first attack method utilizing the
speaker and voice assistant apps on mobile platforms. Also
this attack can be launched by a totally zero permission An-
droid malware and performs many malicious actions based
on sensitive permissions bypassing, such as SMS/Email
forging and privacy stealing.
• New Vulnerability. We found a vulnerability of status check-
ing in Google Search app (over 500 million installations),
which can be utilized by GVS-Attack to dial arbitrary mali-
cious numbers even when the phone is securely locked with
password.
• Prototype Implementation and Evaluation in Real World.
We implemented a VoicEmployer prototype and carried out
related experiments to demonstrate the feasibility of GVS-
Attack. We also designed and tested related attack assist-
ing schemes, including context-aware information analysis,
sound volume setting, etc. These schemes make GVS-Attack
more practical in real world.
Roadmap. The rest sections are organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 provides Google Voice Search related contents, including
backgrounds, vulnerability analysis and the adversary model. The
details of GVS-Attack are described in Section 3, which contains
three different levels of attacks. In the following Section 4, a
VoicEmployer prototype was implemented and related experiments
were carried out. Section 5 and Section 6 discuss corresponding
defense strategies and some related in-depth topics respectively.
Previous research about sensor based attacks and Android app
security analysis are reviewed in Section 7. Section 8 concludes
this paper.
2. GOOGLE VOICE SEARCH ON ANDROID
2.1 Backgrounds
Google Services Framework. Google Services Framework /
Google Mobile Services are pre-installed on nearly all brands of
Android devices. It can be treated as a suit of pre-installed apps de-
veloped by Google, including Google Play, Gmail, Google Search,
etc. [25] These killer apps (Google Search app has over 500 million
installations just on Google Play) are so popular that even cus-
tomized Android firmwares would keep them. Taking Cyanogen-
Mod2 as an example, due to licensing restrictions, Google Services
Framework cannot come pre-installed with CyanogenMod, but
these apps can still be installed via separate Google Apps recovery
package [16].
Android Intent Mechanism. In Android OS, Intent mechanism
allows an app start an activity / service in another app by describing
a simple action, like "view map" and "take a picture" [1]. An Intent
is a messaging object which declares a recipient (and contains
data). VoicEmployer utilizes this mechanism to invoke Google
Voice Search module of Google Search app. From Android OS’
view, it only executes a normal operation to invoke a system built-
in app module.
An intent filter is an expression in an app’s manifest file that
specifies the type of intents that the component would like to
receive [1]. For example, in the manifest file of Google Search app,
2http://www.cyanogenmod.org/
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there defines hands free function (voice commands) related compo-
nents can receive two kinds of actions, namely ACTION_VOICE_
COMMAND [2] and ACTION_VOICE_SEARCH_HANDS_FREE [3].
2.2 Google Search App Vulnerability Analysis
Google Voice Search is a voice assistant component / module
of Google Search app. It is designed for hands free operations
and can accept several kinds of voice commands, such as “call
Jack” and “what’s weather tomorrow”. Google Voice Search runs
in two modes: Voice Dialer – Figure 1(a) and Velvet – Figure
1(b). Voice Dialer mode only accepts voice dialing commands and
Velvet mode is the full function mode. Google Voice Search can be
invoked through Android Intent mechanism. First, a third-party
app constructs an Intent based on ACTION_VOICE_COMMAND
or ACTION_VOICE_SEARCH_HANDS_FREE, and then passes it
to startActivity(). Android OS resolves this Intent and
finds Google Search app can handle it. Then this Intent is passed
to Google Search app. According to the current phone status3,
different modes will be started by Google Search app, namely:
1. If the phone is unlocked and the screen is on, Velvet mode
will be started.
2. If the phone is insecurely locked, namely sliding to unlock
the screen without authentication, Voice Dialer mode will be
started.
3. If the phone is securely locked, such as using password and
pattern password, a voice warning will be played: "please
unlock the device".
Vulnerability in Google Search App. Actually Voice Dialer
mode can be started even the phone is securely locked. But this
function is only designed for the Bluetooth headset hands free
mode. This scene is reasonable, because the user must confirm
the first connection requirement of the Bluetooth headset on his
phone, which is a process of authorization. When the user long
presses the button on his Bluetooth headset, if the phone is not
in call process, the corresponding event can trigger passing an
ACTION_VOICE_COMMAND based Intent to the OS. In Android
source codes, HeadsetStateMachine.java defines and han-
dles related operations [5].
But we found a vulnerability that Google Search app doesn’t
strictly check whether the phone is connected with a Bluetooth
headset. This vulnerability results in that a third-party app can
pass an ACTION_VOICE_COMMAND based Intent to the OS and
triggers Voice Dialer mode of Google Voice Search, even when
the phone is securely locked. Through decompiling the apk file
of Google Search app (version 3.3.11.1069658.arm4, released on
March 14th 2014), we analyzed related code workflows and located
this vulnerability. Figure 2 shows the simplified logical flow of
Google Search app handling voice assistant type of Intent. The
area bounded by the dotted line is the location of the vulnerability
of status checking.
2.3 Adversary Model
GVS-Attack needs to be launched by an Android malware
(called VoicEmployer) which has been installed on the user’s
3The code implementations of corresponding status checking
are: KeyguardManager.isKeyguardLocked(),
KeyguardManager.isKeyguardSecure() and
PowerManager.isScreenOn().
4Following versions have been applied code obfuscation tech-
niques, and this vulnerability still exists.
phone. This malware could disguise as a normal app and contains
attack modules. Since VoicEmployer doesn’t need any permission,
so this disguise should be quite easy. After VoicEmployer is
opened by the user (namely the victim) once, the subsequent attack
processes don’t need to interact with the victim. The scene of attack
scenario is when the victim is not using his Android phone.
Assumptions. GVS-Attack contains three different levels: Basic
Attack, Extended Attack and Remote Voice Control Attack.
1. The victim’s Android phone contains complete Google Ser-
vices Framework. The reason is VoicEmployer needs to
invoke Google Voice Search (and Google speech recognition
/ synthesis service) to execute attacks.
2. The victim’s Android phone is securely locked or not. The
secure lock status corresponds to Basic Attack and the
insecure lock status corresponds to all levels of attacks.
The requirement of the first assumption is quite weak, because
most smartphone vendors pre-install Google Services Framework
on their products. To the second assumption, through utilizing
the vulnerability of Google Search app, Basic Attack of malicious
number dialing can be launched even when the phone is securely
locked. To launch Extended Attack and Remote Voice Control
Attack, an additional assumption is that the victim doesn’t use se-
cure screen lock functions, such as password and pattern password.
Because Google Voice Search cannot run in Velvet mode without
unlocking the screen. Actually for convenience, many users (more
than 30%) would not like to use secure screen lockers [40, 48].
Zero Permission. In our designs, GVS-Attack can be launched
by VoicEmployer without any permission. Android OS uses
a permission mechanism to enforce restrictions on the specific
operations that a particular process can perform. The permis-
sion abusing problem has been noticed long before, that some
sensitive permissions (such as CAMERA, RECORD_AUDIO and
READ_CONTACTS) are utilized by malicious apps to collect user
privacy and achieve other illegal targets. Because this problem is
so widespread, some users will pay attention to an unknown or new
app requiring sensitive permissions [22].
Instead of requesting these permissions explicitly, our attack can
perform sensitive actions protected by permissions only using the
speaker. According to the current Android permission mechanism,
playing audio doesn’t require any permission.
Context-aware Information Collection and Analysis. Since
played voice commands may be heard and interrupted by the
victim, VoicEmployer needs to analyze the current environment
to decide whether launching attacks, that is collecting information
through sensors and legal Android SDK API implementations.
On mobile platforms, the feasibility of context-aware information
analysis has been demonstrated in several previous research [24,
34, 44]. Actually this target also could be achieved without any
permission. For example, light sensor and accelerometer can be
used to analyze the external environment. And the internal status
of the phone can be checked through analyzing CPU workload,
memory workload, etc., all of which can be accessed free from any
permission.
Typical Attack Scene. Due to job requirements or just personal
habits, many people don’t turn off their phones even they are
sleeping [46]. In the early morning (before dawn, such as 3 AM),
the victim is likely to be in deep sleep and the environment is
quiet. The sound volume of played voice commands could be very
low and still be recognized by Google Voice Search. According
to sleep related medical research, nocturnal awakenings usually
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Figure 2: The Vulnerability of status checking in Google Search app
occur with noise levels greater than 55 dB [38]. It means voice
commands of low sound volume will not awaken the victim. This
situation provides an ideal scenario for GVS-Attack launching. The
following sections are based on this typical scene.
3. ATTACKS
The basic idea behind GVS-Attack is to exploit the capability
of Google Voice Search and bypass Android permission checking
mechanism. VoicEmployer can trigger Google Voice Search to the
foreground and then plays an audio file in the background. This
audio file records a voice command, like "call number 1234 5678".
Android system allows an app playing audio files in a service,
which means it doesn’t need to start an activity and show UI. This
voice command can be recognized by Google Voice Search and the
corresponding operation will be executed. Because Google Voice
Search can accept several kinds of commands including sending
SMS, opening maps, making notes, etc., attacks can be varied.
There are two highlights in our attacks:
Attack in Any Situation. Through utilizing the vulnerability
of status checking in Google Search app, zero permission based
VoicEmployer can dial arbitrary malicious numbers even when the
phone is securely locked.
Remote Data Transmission and Voice Control. User Data can
be transmitted via the call channel. Also the attacker can control
the victim’s Android phone remotely. Generally a mobile malware
needs quite sensitive privileges (even root) to achieve remote
control. However our attack doesn’t need any permission.
GVS-Attack provides a new inter-application communication
channel for mobile malware attacks. In the process of GVS-
Attack, the input of microphone (Google Voice Search) comes
from the output of speaker (VoicEmployer). This information
transmission process is beyond the control of Android OS, namely
an uncontrolled physical communication channel or a kind of
covert channel. Figure 3 shows this communication channel.
Android OS cannot distinguish the source of voice commands,
namely whether they come from the user or an internal app. This
new attack channel is totally different from previous research on
security of application communications [32, 14].
In the following subsections, three types of attack designs are de-
scribed in details. Basic Attack can be launched by VoicEmployer
even when the phone is securely locked. With the assumption that
the victim doesn’t use secure screen lock functions, GVS-Attack
are extended to bypass several sensitive permissions in Extended
Attack. Combined previous two attacks, the attacker can interact
with the phone, which results in Remote Voice Control Attack.
Sound Wave
Transmission
through Air
VoicEmployer 
Google 
Voice 
Search
Figure 3: Inter-Application Communication Channel of GVS-
Attack
3.1 Basic Attack: Malicious Number Dialing
Basic Attack achieves arbitrary malicious number dialing. That
is to say the CALL_PHONE permission is bypassed directly. The
vulnerability of Google Search app makes this attack still valid
when the phone is securely locked. Without dismissing screen
keyguard, Google Voice Search would run in Voice Dialer mode
which only accepts dialing type of commands, like Figure 1(a)
shows. Before launching attacks, we answer two questions first:
how to invoke Google Voice Search and how to prepare voice
command files.
Google Voice Search Invoking. When both the external envi-
ronment and the phone internal status reach the predefined trigger
threshold, VoicEmployer will invoke Google Voice Search through
Android Intent mechanism. Actually VoicEmployer just needs
to construct an Intent based on ACTION_VOICE_COMMAND or
ACTION_VOICE_SEARCH_HANDS_FREE, and passes it to API
startActivity(). When the phone is securely locked, Google
Voice Search is designed keeping the disable status and requiring
the user to dismiss keyguard. But if the Intent is constructed
using ACTION_VOICE_COMMAND, recalling Section 2.2, this
restriction can be bypassed.
Voice Command Files Preparation. After Google Voice Search
start, VoicEmployer plays an audio file (voice commands) as a
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background service. These played voice commands could be pack-
aged in VoicEmployer as a part of apk resource, but this method
would increase the size of installation package. A more covert
solution is utilizing Google Text-to-Speech (TTS) [4] service which
is a system built-in service used for translating text contents to
speech. TTS service is based on Internet, but it doesn’t require
that the app invoking TTS declares the INTERNET permission.
Therefore VoicEmployer can execute speech synthesis and save
results as an audio file in its own data folder (internal storage)
dynamically.
Attack Launching. The scene of attack scenario is when the
victim is not using his Android phone, namely the phone is
in system sleep status (screen off). In previous preparations,
VoicEmployer synthesizes two audio records like “call 1234 5678”
and “OK”, in which 1234 5678 could be a malicious number.
When this attack is launched, Voice Dialer mode of Google
Voice Search is started first and VoicEmployer plays the audio
record – “call 1234 5678”. Then Voice Dialer recognizes this
command and gives a voice feedback “do you want to call 1234
5678, say OK or cancel”. VoicEmployer plays another audio record
“OK”. After receiving this confirmation, finally Voice Dialer makes
a call to 1234 5678. Since 1234 5678 is a malicious number,
so if the dial is connected, the victim’s phone account will be
charged with premium-rate service fee. Therefore even only dialing
commands can be accepted, the victim has to afford to lose money
and his phone number is leaked.
3.2 Extended Attack: Sensitive Permissions
Bypassing
Extended Attack needs to invoke Velvet mode of Google Voice
Search, like Figure 1(b) shows. Therefore this attack occurs in the
situation that the victim doesn’t use secure screen lock functions on
his Android phone. In addition, VoicEmployer needs to unlock and
turn on the screen itself.
In general, an app needs the WAKE_LOCK permission to wake
the phone from sleep status, and then sets flag LayoutParams.FL
AG_DISMISS_KEYGUARD to dismiss the screen keyguard. Since
WAKE_LOCK is not a sensitive permission and doesn’t correlate
with user data, so this requirement is not exorbitant. Actually
there is a tricky implementation to bypass this permission. That is,
VoicEmployer invokes Google Voice Search once and does nothing
until it exits for timeout. At this moment, the phone has been in
waked status (the screen is on) and the keyguard has be dismissed.
It can be treated as that VoicEmployer exploits the WAKE_LOCK
permission of Google Voice Search to wake the phone.
User Sensitive Data Collection. Running in Velvet mode,
Google Voice Search can accept more types of voice commands [26],
not just dialing commands. Different voice commands can lead to
different information leakages. Some commands make that specific
operations are executed, such as sending SMS. Other querying
type of commands will trigger voice feedbacks from Google Voice
Search, such as “what is the time?” will get “the time is 9:39 pm”.
Typical information leakages include (italic sentences are voice
commands or voice feedback):
• “Email to [contacts], subject “meeting cancel”, message
“tomorrow’s meeting has been canceled”.” This command
results in sending an Email to the contacts with the above
subject and message, which means it can be used to forge
Emails with any contents.
• “Send SMS to number 1234 5678 “confirm subscribe to
weather forecast service”.” This command results in sending
an SMS to number 1234 5678 (prepared by the attacker),
which means it can be used to forge SMS and subscribe to
premium-rate services.
• “What is my next meeting?” ⇒“Your next calendar entry is
tomorrow 10 AM. The tile is “Meet with boss”.” The victim’s
calendar schedule is leaked through voice feedback.
• “What is my IP address?” ⇒ “Your public IP address is
111.222.111.222.” The victim’s IP address is leaked through
voice feedback.
• “Where is my location?” ⇒ “Here is a map of Brooklyn
District.” The victim’s location (district level) is leaked
through voice feedback.
Actually it equals that VoicEmployer exploits the capability of
Google Voice Search and bypasses Android permission checking
mechanism. From the Android OS’s view, VoicEmployer just
passed an Intent and plays some audio files. Table 1 shows the
permissions which can be bypassed through GVS-Attack. Some
voice commands are not listed, because they need interaction
operations (touch the screen) of the user, such as “create a calendar
event ...” and “post to Google plus ...”.
Table 1: Permissions Bypassed by GVS-Attack
Voice Command Bypassed Permission(s)
Call ... READ_CONTACTS,
CALL_PHONE
Listen to voicemail WRITE_SETTINGS,
CALL_PHONE
Browse to Google dot com INTERNET
Email to ... READ_CONTACTS,
GET_ACCOUNTS, INTERNET
Send SMS to ... READ_CONTACTS,
WRITE_SMS, SEND_SMS
Set alarm for ... SET_ALARM
Note to myself ... GET_ACCOUNTS,
RECORD_AUDIO, INTERNET
What is my next meeting? READ_CALENDAR
Show me pictures of ... INTERNET
What is my IP address? ACCESS_WIFI_STATE,
INTERNET
Where is my location? ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION,
INTERNET
How far from here to ...? ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION,
INTERNET
Remote Data Transmission. GVS-Attack can dial a malicious
number through playing “call ...”, when this call is answered by an
auto audio record machine, actually the data transmission channel
has been built. Any audio type of data can be transferred through
this channel instead of commonly used Internet connection.
Google Voice Search running during calling period. In Android
OS, the audio recording method is synchronized, which means
multiple apps cannot access the microphone at the same time on
SDK API level. But as an essential system module, the phone call
function of Android is based on hardware-level implementations
instead of invoking MediaRecorder / AudioRecord class.
Android OS only sends control signals and related hardware (GSM
module, microphone, speaker, etc.) complete audio data processing
functions directly [6]. Therefore during the phone call period,
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another app can also access the microphone through Android SDK
API. It means Google Voice Search still can be triggered to the
foreground to accept voice commands5 normally.
Therefore, to querying commands, the feedback voice can be
got by the attacker through this call channel. Based on speech
recognition techniques, the attacker can get the corresponding text
information directly. More details, VoicEmployer invokes Google
Voice Search and then plays voice command “call number 1234
5678”, in which 1234 5678 is the number of a malicious auto audio
record machine. After this call connects, VoicEmployer invokes
Google Voice Search and plays querying commands again, like
“where is my location”. The feedback voice – “here is a map of Sha
Tin district” of Google Voice Search is transmitted to the attacker
through the call channel.
If VoicEmployer could get more permissions, more sensitive
information of the victim would be leaked. A natural idea
is to play audio records on external storage directly. These
audio records are recorded by the victim previously and prob-
ably contain sensitive information, like a business negotiation.
This operation is based on the READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE6 or
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE permission. Both of them allow
an app read all data on external storage, not just its own folder.
For text files, they can be translated to audio data through TTS
service. For example, with the READ_CONTACTS permission,
VoicEmployer can get phone contacts of the victim. Then it utilizes
TTS service to speak these texts of contacts directly. So the attacker
can get a complete copy of the victim’s contacts through the
call channel. Similar potential risks include READ_CALL_LOG,
READ_SMS, etc.
The voice channel is not just used for transferring text in-
formation. Actually any type of files can be translated to hex
coding formats, hence in theory any file could be transmitted in
the form of audio coding (or even read hex codes directly). So
when the attacker receives all hex codes of a photo on external
storage through the call channel, he can restore it easily. If
this photo contains sensitive information, such as selfie, leaked
information will be quite harmful to the victim. Also in practical
attacks, compressed encoding and checking mechanism need to be
considered.
3.3 Remote Voice Control Attack: Real World
Case Study
Remote Voice Control Attack combines previous Basic Attack
and Extended Attack. This attack also needs to invoke Velvet mode
of Google Voice Search.
In Remote Voice Control Attack, after VoicEmployer triggers a
malicious number dialing, the attacker answers this call directly.
During the calling period, VoicEmployer invokes Google Voice
Search periodically. When the attacker speak some voice com-
mands, these commands will be played by the speaker (headset)
of victim’s phone. Then Google Voice Search recognizes these
commands and executes corresponding operations. It means that
the attacker can interact with the victim’s phone through Google
Voice Search, namely remote voice control.
Previous research [54] showed more than 90% of Android mal-
5Google Voice Search is an Internet based service. With 3G/4G or
Wi-Fi data connection, the phone can make phone call and access
the Internet at the same time. To 2G data connection (GPRS and
EDGE), the two functions are conflicting.
6The READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE permission is added from
Android 4.1. But before Android 4.4, users must turn on this
permission checking option manually. Otherwise, an app still can
read all data on external storage without any permission.
wares would turn the compromised phones into a botnet controlled
through network or short messages. These controls were based on
corresponding communication permissions (such as INTERNET
and SEND_SMS) or even root privilege. But our remote control
method exploits the capability of Google Voice Search to build the
communication channel and touch sensitive data. These targets are
completed without corresponding permissions.
With special designs, Remote Voice Control Attack could be-
come quite powerful. One example of voice interaction is the
command “How far from here to Lincoln Memorial by car?”.
Google Voice Search provides a voice feedback like “The drive
from your location to Lincoln Memorial is 17.6 kilometers”. Then
the attacker can use the successive approximation method to ask
similar questions of different locations and until get a feedback like
“The drive from your location to White House is 120 meters”. At
this moment, the attacker gets the accurate location of the victim,
which is quite dangerous. Based similar methods, more dangerous
attacks could be designed.
Another example is that the attacker can leave a note to the victim
using the command “Note to self: You have been hacked”. Google
Voice Search would make a note (send an Email to the victim
himself) with the content “You have been hacked”. In the morning,
after the victim get up, he will find his phone appears such a strange
note. Also based on this thought, some complex social engineering
attacks [28] could be designed and launched.
4. IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Overall Structure and Attack Experiments
Based on previous descriptions, we implemented a VoicEm-
ployer prototype to demonstrate our attack schemes. Our im-
plementation of VoicEmployer contains 5 modules: MainAc-
tivity, AlarmReceivor, EnvironmentService, WakedActivity and
VoiceCommandService.
• MainActivity shows the normal starting UI which seems
like a normal app. Its main functions include registering an
alarm and preparing audio files of voice commands.
• AlarmReceivor is designed to receive alarm events and
start EnvironmentService.
• EnvironmentService is designed for context-aware in-
formation collection and analysis. Analyzed aspects include
light sensor, accelerometer, /proc/, system workloads,
etc. All of these collection operations don’t require any
permission. If the analysis results reach a predefined thresh-
old, WakedActivity will be started. Related implementation
details are described in Section 4.2.
• WakedActivity is designed to dismiss insecure screen
keyguard through setting LayoutParams.FLAG_DISMISS
_KEYGUARD. This function only can be implemented in
Activity components. Without dismissing screen keyguard,
Velvet mode cannot be started. Note: This module is not
necessary for Basic Attack.
• VoiceCommandService is designed to invoke Google
Voice Search and play voice command files. Voice command
playing will be delayed a short while to wait Google Voice
Search ready. To Remote Voice Control Attack, Google
Voice Search will be invoked periodically.
Taking Remote Voice Control Attack as an example, Figure 4
shows the workflow of VoicEmployer implementation. It utilizes
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the alarm mechanism to trigger attack related modules to avoid
constant background services.
EnvironmentService: 
Content-awareness 
analysis
MainActivity: Run once 
to prepare voice 
command file
MainActivity: Register 
alarm at next  t AM
VoiceCommandService: 
Play voice command: 
Call number XXXX
Satisfy
Not Satisfy
Periodic trigger
VoiceCommandService: 
Invoke Google Voice 
Search
Call answered
Context-aware 
Information 
Analysis.
Google Voice 
Search 
Invoking.
Playing Voice 
Commands  
and  Follow-up 
Attacks.
WakedActivity:
Dismiss keyguard
AlarmReceivor: Start 
EnvironmentService
VoiceCommandService: 
Invoke Google Voice 
Search 
Delay to wait GVS ready
t AM Alarm trigger
Attack 
Preparation.
Optional
Figure 4: Workflow of VoicEmployer Implementation
Attack Results. In order to make GVS-Attack work well, the
victim’s phone should use Android 4.1 or upper versions. Because
Google Search app running on Android 4.0 or lower versions
cannot be updated to the newest version which supports more voice
commands. It is a measure of encouraging system update to avoid
version fragmentation. The experiment versions of Google Search
app were 3.3.11.1069658.arm and 3.4.16.1149292.arm, which
were released on March 14th 2014 and May 6th 2014 respectively.
We tested VoicEmployer prototype on Samsung Galaxy S3 GT-
I9300, Meizu MX2 and Motorola A953. GVS-Attack can be
launched on all of them successfully. On Samsung Galaxy S3
using the official firmware, S Voice app [42] (a built-in voice
assistant developed by Samsung) would be started, not generally
Google Voice Search, but attack processes are similar. This change
derives from that Samsung sets a higher priority in the manifest
file of S Voice app to respond ACTION_VOICE_COMMAND and
ACTION_VOICE_SEARCH_HANDS_FREE. Table 2 summarizes
the experiment results.
Speech Recognition Accuracy. We consider Command Success
Table 2: GVS-Attack Experiments
Phone Model Android Version Attack Result
Samsung Galaxy S3 CyanogenMod 4.4.2 successSamsung Official 4.3 success
Meizu MX2 Meizu official 4.2.1 success
Motolora A953 CyanogenMod 4.1.1 success
Rate (CSR) instead of Word Error Rate (WER) [43], because
executing results are what we only care. Actually test results
showed CSR was nearly 100%. This high percentage comes from
three reasons: 1. the attack scene is the quiet environment, which
means there is no interfering noise; 2. these command sentences are
simple English, which don’t lead to ambiguity; 3. VoicEmployer
utilizes Google TTS to synthesize the command speech, which
removes accent and pronunciation problems.
Detection by Anti-Virus Apps. We tested the following
anti-virus apps for Android platform: AVG AntiVirus7, McAfee
Antivirus & Security8, Avira Antivirus Security9, ESET Mobile
Security & Antivirus10 and Norton Mobile Security11. After
executing threat scanning, none of them reported VoicEmployer
prototype as a malware. Also in the attack processes, none of their
real-time monitoring modules can detect GVS-Attack’s malicious
behaviors.
4.2 Context-aware Information Collection and
Analysis Experiments
The scene of GVS-Attack scenario is when the victim is not
using his Android phone. Especially in the early morning (before
dawn, such as 3 AM), the victim is likely to be in deep sleep. To
avoid that played voice commands may be found and interrupted by
the victim, VoicEmployer needs to analyze the current environment
before deciding whether launching attacks, including external
environment and phone status. This target can be achieved through
sensors and legal Android SDK API implementations without any
permission. If the analysis result shows the victim is using his
phone, VoicEmployer will keep inactive status. Otherwise, GVS-
Attack could be launched. Analysis aspects and criteria include:
• Light sensor. Get the current external environment bright-
ness: if the brightness is very low (such as less than 5% of
max), it means the phone is probably in pockets / bags or the
victim has turned off the room lamp at night.
• Accelerometer. Get the current posture information of the
phone: if the result shows the phone is in static status
(namely stable readings), it means the victim is probably not
holding / taking the phone.
• Android SDK class - PowerManager. Check the screen is
on or off: if the screen is off, it means the victim is probably
not using the phone.
• Android SDK class - SimpleDateFormat. Get the
current system time: for example, 3 AM means the victim
is likely to be in deep sleep.
7https://www.avgmobilation.com/
8https://www.mcafeemobilesecurity.com/
9http://www.avira.com/en/free-antivirus-android
10http://www.eset.com/us/home/products/mobile-security-android/
11https://mobilesecurity.norton.com/
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• Read /proc/stat and top command. Analyze the cur-
rent CPU workload: if the workload is low (such as less than
50%), it means the victim is probably not using his phone or
running large apps. Note: This value is affected by hardware
configurations and background services.
• Read /proc/meminfo and top command. Analyze the
current RAM usage: if the usage is low (such as less that
50%), it means the victim is probably not using his phone or
running large apps. Note: This value is affected by hardware
configurations and background services.
Based on above analyses, we designed and carried out context-
aware information analysis experiments using EnvironmentService
module in 3 typical scenes:
1. The user is using his phone to play games (take Angry Birds
Rio12 for example) with the room lamp is on.
2. The user is walking on the street, while the phone (screen-
off) is in his trouser pocket.
3. [Target Scene] The phone (screen-off) is put on a horizontal
table with the room lamp is off.
The experiment was based on Meizu MX2 which has current
mainstream hardware configurations (ARM Cortex-A9 quad-core
1.6 GHz, 2 GB LPDDR2 RAM). Before every scene’s test, the
phone was restarted for cutting out distractions of irrelevant factors.
Table 3 shows test results in 30 seconds. We can find that some
item values of Scene 3 (target scene) are significantly different
from those ones of Scene 1 and Scene 2. It demonstrates that
context-aware information analysis can be used to detect the current
environment and assist GVS-Attack practically.
Table 3: Content-aware Information Analysis
Method / Tool Scene 1 Scene 2 Scene3
Light Sensor
Max 304 1 0
Min 126 0 0
Avg 227.95 0.5 0
Accelerometer
X-axis Max 7.78 18.19 0.15
X-axis Min 5.62 -0.06 0.01
X-axis Avg 6.54 8.61 0.10
Y-axis Max -0.50 14.56 0.11
Y-axis Min -1.97 -2.15 -0.10
Y-axis Avg -1.10 4.78 0.01
Z-axis Max 9.46 6.70 10.34
Z-axis Min 5.88 -12.00 10.04
Z-axis Avg 7.60 -0.18 10.22
CPU Workload
Max 59% 43% 40%
Min 32% 22% 18%
Avg 43% 29% 28%
Memory Usage
Max 66.2% 53.4% 52.3%
Min 66.0% 53.2% 52.0%
Avg 66.0% 53.3% 52.0%
Screen Status on off off
4.3 Sound Volume and Sound Pressure Level
Experiments
One issue we concerned is what the sound volume (STREAM_
MUSIC) should be set for playing voice commands. The voice of
12http://www.rovio.com/en/our-work/games
that volume level should be recognized by Google Voice Search
and also may not be noticed by the victim. We call it the minimal
available sound volume (MASV for short). In this section, we only
consider the sound volume setting of the speaker (MODE_NORMAL)
in Extended Attack, not the headset (MODE_IN_CALL). In Remote
Voice Control Attack, the attacker can adjust his own speaking
volume directly.
To different models of Android phones, the actual sound pressure
and the location of speakers are quite different. Mixed with
background white noise, it is impossible to give a fixed sound
volume setting. One solution is using the method of successive
approximation to pretest. Google Speech-to-Text (STT) is a
system built-in service for speech recognition, which uses the
same engine as Google Voice Search and can be invoked through
ACTION_RECOGNIZE_SPEECH [3]. The key point is the app
using STT service can get the text content of input voice directly.
More details, VoicEmployer sets the sound volume to 1 (the
minimum) first, then invokes SST service and plays a prepared test
audio file (the content could be "This is a test message"). Recog-
nized texts will be returned to VoicEmployer and be compared with
the correct texts. If the two sets of texts are the same, VoicEmployer
sets system sound volume to 1 and launches GVS-Attack. If the
two sets of texts are different, VoicEmployer adjusts the volume to
2 and carries out the same test again. This process will be repeated
until finding MASV.
We carried out MASV test experiments in a quiet meeting room
of about 8 m2. The environment background sound pressure levels
(SPL) [50] was about 48 dB. Another relationship we concerned
is SPL vs. distance. In the same experiment environment, we
recorded the transient peak SPL in different distances (0.5 m, 1
m and 2 m) from the phone using the above MASV value. Test
phones were put on a flat table face up without shelter. Table 4
shows corresponding experiment results. We can find that when
the distance exceeds 1 m, the SPL is quite low – only 8 dB
higher than the background SPL. Also the SPL would be less than
55 dB, which is the general noise level threshold of nocturnal
awakenings13 [38].
Table 4: Quiet Meeting Room, SPL vs. Distance, unit: dB
Phone Model 0.5 m 1 m 2 m
Samsung Galaxy S3 – volume 6/15 57 56 54
Meizu MX2 – volume 5/15 58 54 53
Motolora A953 – volume 6/15 58 56 54
5. DEFENSE
There exist some possible (but not perfect) schemes to defend
GVS-Attack. The vulnerability of status checking in Google
Search app should be fixed first. When Google Search app receives
an ACTION_VOICE_COMMAND based Intent, if the phone is
securely locked, it must strictly check whether a Bluetooth headset
is connected with the phone. If the connect status is true, Voice
Dialer can be started. Otherwise, a warning should be provided,
like “please unlock the device first”. Therefore, in the situation of
secure screen lock, GVS-Attack cannot be launched and the phone
is safe.
13Actually the noise-induced nocturnal awakening is affected by
many factors, such as sleep stages, age, gender, smoking, etc. Also
sensitivity to noise may vary greatly from one individual to another.
These topics are beyond the scope of this paper. More details see
the guideline document [30] of World Health Organization (WHO).
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From the aspect of app development, one solution is at run
time, Google Voice Search must check the status of speaker in
real time, not just in the moment of initialization. If some app is
accessing the speaker, Google Voice Search should suspend that
app immediately. But this solution may affect other apps’ user
experience. For example, an IM app may not play its notification
sound when new message reaching.
From the aspect of Android Intent mechanism, system built-
in apps / services should also add customized permissions in the
manifest file. if a third-party app wants to invoke a system built-in
app / service, it must declare these requirements before installing.
So the user needs to confirm the authorization or not installs this
app. But this defense method may result in similar abuse problems
like system permissions.
From the aspect of user identification, speaker recognition (or so
called voiceprint recognition) techniques [10] should be deployed
to verify the identity of the speaker. If voiceprint authentication
fails, Google Voice Search will not accept the next voice com-
mands. Touchless Control [37] (a variant of Google Voice Search,
only for Motorola phones) has added this function to authenticate
the current user through speaking "OK, Google" [36]. Also
potential problems may be how to defend voice replay attacks.
6. DISCUSSION
Soundless Attack. One potential limitation of GVS-Attack is
that the victim may notice the voice command played by VoicEm-
ployer and interrupt it. One direct idea is whether soundless GVS-
Attack could be launched. That is, VoicEmployer imports an audio
file to the microphone directly without playing it, like creating
a loopback. But in Android OS, the audio recording method is
synchronized. It means the microphone cannot support multi-
progress accessing at the same time. So when Google Voice Search
is accessing microphone to accept voice commands, VoicEmployer
cannot access microphone at the same time at least on SDK API
level. Also about audio files as the input of microphone, this
feature needs the support of kernel / drivers. On Windows and
Linux platforms, there exist such drivers (such as VB-Audio Virtual
Cable [49]) to simulate a virtual microphone device. But on
Android platform, an app cannot modify kernel or install drivers
directly. One feasible solution is to prepare a customized Android
version with modified audio drivers. One recent research [53]
has been aware of security risks in Android device driver cus-
tomizations. Android inherits the driver management methods
of Linux and devices are placed under /dev (or /sys) as files.
Zhou et al. found the vulnerability that certain important devices
become unprotected (permission setting) during a customization.
An unauthorized app can get access to sensitive devices, namely
user data. Based on this method, similar vulnerability may occur
on audio drivers (/dev/snd), but we have not found such a case
of unprotected writing privileges on our test devices.
Another perspective of soundless attacks is high-frequency
sound (such as higher than 20 kHz), which could be played by the
phone and is difficult to hear by humans [41]. Unfortunately (fortu-
nately for security), Google Voice Search only accepts reasonable
human sound frequency range and filters out other ranges. So the
idea of high-frequency sound is not impracticable.
Since Google Voice Search is an Internet based service, we
also tried to analyze the feasibility of connection hijacking and
data package tampering. But after tests, the difficulties lay on the
connection is TLS protected and the voice data transmission uses
an unclear compressing coding algorithm.
Quiet Vs Noisy. In GVS-Attack, the attack scenario is quiet en-
vironments. The sound volume of played voice commands could be
very low and still be recognized by Google Voice Search. Actually
we also tested the performance of attacks in noisy environments,
such as on the subway and in the canteen. The expected result
would be changed, namely the sound volume of played voice
commands could be very loud and hides in the background noisy.
But test results showed the background noisy (especially human
voice) affected the accuracy of speech recognition, to some degree.
Also context-aware analysis will become complex and may need
the RECORD_AUDIO permission.
Attack Scope. For Google Services Framework is pre-installed
on nearly all brands of Android devices. Therefore most Android
devices can be affected by GVS-Attack, especially these ones
equipped with Android 4.1 or upper versions. To other voice
assistant apps using Google Speech-to-Text (STT) service, similar
attacks could be launched. One example is Speaktoit Assistant14
(Android version), which has over 5 million installations on
Google Play. Other voice assistant apps using independent speech
recognition engines also should be reviewed carefully, such as
Samsung S Voice app. Also similar attacks may also occur on iOS
and Windows Phone platforms. But for the lack of experimental
devices, we didn’t test them temporarily and left for future research.
7. RELATED WORK
Sensor based Attacks. On mobile platforms, sensor based
attacks have been designed and analyzed in several previous
papers [44, 39, 12, 9, 45, 47, 29]. One typical example is
Soundcomber [44]. Schlegel et al. designed a Trojan with
few and innocuous permissions, that can extract targeted private
information (such as credit card and PIN number) from the audio
sensor of the phone. Also it proved that smartphone based malware
can easily achieve targeted, context-aware information discovery
from sound recordings. In another research project, through
completely opportunistic use of the phone’s camera and other
sensors, PlaceRaider [47] can construct three dimensional models
of indoor environments and steal virtual objects.
The work of [39] showed that accelerometer readings are a
powerful side channel that can be used to extract entire sequences
of entered text on a smartphone touchscreen keyboard. In [45],
the designed side-channel attack utilizes the video camera and
microphone to infer PINs entered on a number-only soft keyboard
on a smartphone. The microphone is used to detect touch events,
while the camera is used to estimate the smartphone’s orientation,
and correlate it to the position of the digit tapped by the user. The
work of [29] studied environmental sensor-based covert channels
in mobile malware. Out-of-band command and control channels
could be based on acoustic, light, magnetic and vibrational signal-
ing. This research is a bit like our GVS-Attack in the aspect of
voice command transmission. The differences are that, in GVS-
Attack, the command receiver (Google Voice Search) is not a part
of malware (VoicEmployer) and the RECORD_AUDIO permission
is not necessary. So our attack scheme is more insidious.
Sensors also could be used for fingerprinting devices. A mecha-
nism was proposed by [19] that smartphone accelerometers possess
unique fingerprints, which can be exploited for tracking users. A
similar fingerprinting method was designed with microphone and
speaker in [17]. Through playback and recording of audio samples,
this method could uniquely identify an individual device based on
sound analysis.
Inter-Application Communication. In [14], Chin et al. focused
14http://www.speaktoit.com/
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on Intent-based attack surfaces. It analyzed unauthorized Intent
receipt can leak user information. Data can be stolen by eaves-
droppers and permissions can be accidentally transferred between
apps. Another attack type is Intent spoofing, that a malicious
app sends an Intent to an exported component. If the victim
app takes some action upon receipt of such an Intent, the attack
can trigger that action. In their following work [32], Kantola
et al. proposed modifications to the Android platform to detect
and protect inter-application messages that should have been intra-
application messages. The target is to automatically reduce attack
surfaces in legacy apps.
Application Analysis Android permission-based security has
been analyzed from many aspects. For example, permission
specification and least-privilege security problems were studied
in [21] and [8]. Both of them designed corresponding static
analysis tools to detect over-privilege problems. Permission esca-
lation and leakage problems are also hot research topics. Related
research include [23, 18, 11, 13, 27]. Permission-based behavioral
footprinting was used to detect known malwares in Android market
at large-scale in [55]. The work of [51] noticed the problem of pre-
installed apps. Wu et al. found a lot of those apps were overly
privileged for vendor customizations.
To system code level analysis, dynamic analysis technique is an
efficient solution. TaintDroid [20] is a system-wide dynamic taint
tracking and analysis system capable of simultaneously tracking
multiple sources of sensitive data. It automatically labels (taints)
data from privacy-sensitive sources and transitively applies labels
as sensitive data propagates through program variables, files, and
interprocess messages. DroidScope [52] is an emulation based An-
droid malware analysis engine that can be used to analyze the Java
and native components of Android apps. Unlike current desktop
malware analysis platforms, DroidScope reconstructs both the OS-
level and Java-level semantics simultaneously and seamlessly.
But these analysis methods are useless to our GVS-Attack,
because VoicEmployer doesn’t touch sensitive data and execute
sensitive operations directly. The voice commands are transferred
out of the phone, that is, an uncontrolled physical communication
channel. Also the remote data transmission function is based on the
call channel and the transmission media is sound. These brand-new
features break previous checking and protecting mechanism.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a novel permission bypassing attack method
based on Android system build-in voice assistant module - Google
Voice Search and the speaker. Also the app launching attacks
doesn’t require any permission. But achieved malicious targets
could be quite dangerous and practical, from privacy stealing to
remote voice control. Also utilizing a vulnerability found by us in
Google Search app, this attack can dial arbitrary malicious numbers
even when the phone is securely locked. Related in-depth topics are
also discussed, including context-aware analysis, minimal available
sound volume, soundless attack, etc. Through experiments, the
feasibility of our attack schemes has been demonstrated in real
world. This research may inspire application developers and
researchers rethink that zero permission doesn’t mean safety and
the speaker can be treated as a new attack surface.
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APPENDIX
A. PERMISSIONS STATISTICS
According to Android API Level 19, Google Search app (version
3.4.16.1149292.arm) declares / possesses the following system
defined permissions:
1. ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
2. ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
3. ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
4. ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
5. BIND_APPWIDGET
6. BLUETOOTH
7. BROADCAST_STICKY
8. CALL_PHONE
9. GET_ACCOUNTS
10. GLOBAL_SEARCH
11. INTERNET
12. MANAGE_ACCOUNTS
13. MEDIA_CONTENT_CONTROL
14. MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS
15. READ_CALENDAR
16. READ_CONTACTS
17. READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
18. READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS
19. READ_PROFILE
20. READ_SMS
21. READ_SYNC_SETTINGS
22. RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
23. RECORD_AUDIO
24. SEND_SMS
25. SET_ALARM
26. SET_WALLPAPER
27. SET_WALLPAPER_HINTS
28. STATUS_BAR
29. USE_CREDENTIALS
30. VIBRATE
31. WAKE_LOCK
32. WRITE_CALENDAR
33. WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
34. WRITE_SETTINGS
35. WRITE_SMS
Non-public permissions:
1. CAPTURE_AUDIO_HOTWORD
2. STOP_APP_SWITCHES
3. PRELOAD
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